Yellow
Jack
by
Frederick D. Malkinson
Delivered to The
Chicago Literary Club
October 4,
1999
Yellow fever, also known as yellow jack for the
quarantine flag flown by ships at
sea, became one of the most feared diseases throughout urban
America during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Inadvertently imported from
Africa, yellow fever
made its first New World appearance in the Yucatan and Havana in
1648. "In modern
America, where the triumph over disease is often taken for
granted and yellow fever
has ceased to be a menace, it is difficult to appreciate the
(terror) once engendered by
(that disorder)." It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze
the medical aspects of
yellow fever. Rather, it is to recount some of the intriguing
social and political
consequences of this epidemic disease, the public response and
reaction to it, and,
finally, changing ideas about its etiology and prevention in the
late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The major examples to be cited are the
outbreak of yellow fever in
Philadelphia in 1793 and the repeated epidemics of this disease
in Haiti in the 1790's
and early 1800's.
"The 1793 epidemic of yellow fever in Philadelphia was no mere
round of
sickness but a major public health emergency that paralyzed city
functions, halted
business and trade, and caused a breakdown in social
institutions. The fever's
devastating effects on what was then our nation's capital is
apparent in the grim
statistics left in its wake: (among the city's 45, 000
inhabitants, some 17,000 people
were infected), more than 17, 000 people fled .. for safer
environs (including most
government officials), nearly 5,000 died, and hundreds of
children were orphaned."
"The panic was so great that many people thrust their parents
into the streets as soon
as they complained of a headache." At least six previous
epidemics of yellow fever had
devastated Philadelphia since its founding in 1682, with one
third of the population lost
in 1699.
Briefly, patients seriously ill with yellow fever run
temperatures to 104 F, and
suffer nausea, severe gastro-intestinal upset, headache and
intense generalized pains.
In many patients symptoms remit on the third or fourth day of
illness. In others the
disease progresses rapidly: jaundice, due to liver failure
(which gives the disease its
name) or kidney failure lead to coma and death three to five days
later. In only a week
to ten days, then, the patient is either dead or on the road to
recovery. Overall
mortality figures range widely from less than 10 percent up to 70
percent of infected
individuals in different epidemics.
The first case of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1793 was
diagnosed in early
August by Benjamin Rush, signer of the Declaration of
Independence and the most
renowned physician in the United States at that time. In
November, 1793, Mathew
Carey published his on-the-spot instant history of the epidemic
entitled "A Short
Account of the Malignant Fever, Lately Prevalent in
Philadelphia". Carey, an author
and publisher, was later founder of Lea and Febiger, destined to
be the longest-lived
publishing firm in the United States. Carey's account features
"the collapse of
community under the terrifying burden of the epidemic and the
rebirth of community
through the heroic efforts of a small band of public-spirited
volunteers . " He
described streets filled with refugees and their belongings
fleeing the city, a devastated
local economy, massive, almost instant unemployment, universal
terror, and the
breakdown of established governmental authority. Left on their
own, most people
became obsessed with fears of heavenly punishment and thoughts of
personal survival
and protective isolation. Carey described the impact of the
disaster within the family
when fear of contagiousness was rife: "Who, without horror, can
reflect on a husband
. deserting his wife in the last agony, a wife unfeelingly
abandoning her husband on
his death bed - parents forsaking their only children - children
ungratefully flying from
their parents, resigning them to chance, often without an inquiry
after their health or
safety .. less concern was felt from the loss of a parent, a
husband, a wife, or an only
child than, on other occasions would have been caused by the
death of a ..favourite
lap-dog.." Carey describes many instances in which people were
left to die unattended
when supportive care might well have saved their lives.
On September 10 Mayor Clarkson, one of the few government
officials who
stayed in the city, established the Committee on Malignant Fever,
composed of
volunteers to assume social and medical support responsibilities.
Carey, a committee
member, wrote that the Committee was "so highly favored by
providence, that they
have been the instrument of averting the progress of destruction,
eminently relieving
the distressed, and restoring confidence to the terrified
inhabitants of Philadelphia".
The Committee first supervised the rehabilitation of the city's
Bush Hill Hospital: a
systematic plan for hospital admissions was organized, rooms were
cleaned, patients
were grouped according to disease stages in the hope of
preventing further spread,
plentiful medical supplies and food were procured, and patient
care was greatly
intensified with the enhanced hiring of nurses and attendants.
This Committee met
daily - often into the late hours of the night - from
mid-September through November,
and essentially became the functional governmental body for the
city. The members
also formed an orphanage for the children, provided food,
clothing, and some support
for those left without resources, obtained carts and caskets for
burials and hired
gravediggers.
As Sally Griffith has written, Carey's description of community
destruction and
rebirth has influenced the ways in which Americans have responded
thereafter to all
forms of civic catastrophes over the last two centuries. In
disastrous floods over the
years, for just one example, volunteer citizen groups have
restored order, fought flood
waters and provided rescue services and general aid to the
victims. As Griffith has
written, "Beyond its immediate significance, in telling the story
of how benevolent
citizens came forward to save their community, Carey contributed
to the development
of a broader paradigm of citizen voluntarism, in which the
people' themselves, not the
(city or) state, band together in moments of public emergency and
reknit the bonds of
society."
When the first American newspaper was published in Boston in
1690, it
promised to publish news of God's making once a month, but did
propose to appear
more often if "any Glut of Occurrences happen". Gradually the
prime responsibility for
making the world interesting to read about shifted from God to
the newspaperman.
Even so, in the late 18th century, Daniel Boorstin describes most
newspapers as being,
"little more than excuses for espousing a political position, for
listing the arrival and
departure of ships, for familiar essays and useful advice, or for
commercial or legal
announcements" However, during the epidemic crisis in
Philadelphia, the daily
"Federal Gazette" - the only one of eight newspapers still being
published by mid-September - became an extremely important
source of information about the fever,
supplied in good part now from the newspaper's readers
themselves. The role of the
newspaper, then, at least among the literate, became crucial to
the public response to
the epidemic. In addition to the publication of "authentic
information", the paper's
articles also included "ordinary people passing along rumors,
offering folk cures .
speculating on the religious meaning of the disease, and sharing
their fears and
sorrows." Obsessed by information about the fever and
authentication of facts versus
rumors, Philadelphia's citizens found that the most accurate
information was only
available in the "Federal Gazette". Mayor Clarkson contributed
regular communiqu s
to the paper, ranging from public orders on sanitation to the
death toll of the week. The
public Committee also placed frequent communications in the
newspaper on its
activities and its supervision of hospital services. The
physicians of the city, too, were
regular contributors, attempting to serve the public and to
establish the authority of a
particular mode of treatment. So intense was the flow of
contradictory therapeutic
recommendations, however, that many readers sent in letters of
protest, claiming that
these various opinions contributed to, rather than assuaged, the
general distress of the
populace. Common, too, were letters of censure for doctors,
ministers and politicians -
Pennsylvania Governor Mifflin and the main body of the Federal
Government, including
treasury secretary Alexander Hamilton, vice-president Thomas
Jefferson and even
President George Washington - who abandoned their duties and
hastily left the
city.
The anxiety for information overwhelmed the fear of death, and
the bonds of
communication established and maintained by the "Gazette" may
have been more
valuable than all of the treatment measures the physicians
prescribed. "With notes,
letters, discussions, arguments, prayers and meditations in the
newspaper, (readers)
replenished the texts of public discourse. For these
(individuals) newspaper
readership was a form of active citizenship, a way to participate
in the on-going
conversation of their community."
At long last, in late October, the "Gazette" published the
Committee's
announcement of the official end of the epidemic.
From a medical viewpoint, good health in 1793 was associated in
the minds of
many Philadelphia physicians with a recent theory of illness
based on the maintenance
of tone, strength and elasticity of blood vessels. Adhering to
this theory, Benjamin
Rush believed that all disease was related to excessive
stimulation of the vasculature.
As a consequence he argued that the only reasonable treatment for
yellow fever
victims was to relieve that excitement by heroic bleeding and
purging, and the
administration of powerful emetics. Other physicians, however,
prescribed much
gentler, essentially supportive therapy. There were also sharply
divided opinions about
the source of yellow fever. Many physicians believed that an
effluvium or miasma
arose from local sources of decay and spread disease through the
air. Rush
diagnosed that source as rotting containers of tobacco on
Philadelphia wharves, left
there because of disease decimation among the dock workers.
Others argued that
yellow fever simply spread from person to person. It is clear
now, of course, that
neither the form of treatment used, nor the theory of disease
spread, had any effect on
the recovery of patients or the implementation of disease
prevention.
Rush's name is synonymous for the 1793 epidemic largely because
of his
intrepid method of treatment which included copious bloodletting
of up to several pints
of blood. In addition, however, Rush was also known to link the
organization of social
and political systems with the health of the people comprising
these systems and to
address medical concerns in light of their impact on both the
body and body politic.
Later on , in an amusing letter written to John Adams in 1806,
Rush disclosed a great
antipathy towards the country's leaders in his proposal that,
"the remedies for .
yellow fever would do wonders with the heads of the men who now
move our world .
Bleeding would probably lessen the rage for altering the
Constitution of Pennsylvania
in the leaders of the party who are now contending for that
measure .. The cold bath
might cure the peevish irritability of some of the members of our
congress, and blisters
and mustard plasters arouse the apathy of others. In short,
there is a great field open
for new means of curing moral and political maladies."
The yellow fever epidemic forged interesting links between health
and politics.
In addition to the two main theories of treating the disease,
different additional ideas
arose about its origins. Poor sanitation and local climatic
conditions were considered
causative by some. Others blamed the epidemic on unhealthy
conditions aboard ships
docking in Philadelphia. Many ships carried refugee passengers
fleeing warfare in
some of the Caribbean islands where yellow fever had been endemic
for almost 150
years. Many of the Jeffersonian Republican physicians believed
in the theory of
causative local factors and backed Rush's strenuous "cures",
while doctors espousing
the "importationist" theory (largely Hamiltonian Federalists) had
adopted gentler
treatment measures. A number of prominent local and national
political figures also
took their respective party position on the origin of the
epidemic. In aligning
themselves with national parties for increased moral support,
physicians and their allies
"became an integral chapter in the history of the (formation of)
the first political party
system" in the United States. Since it was well-known that
yellow fever epidemics
favored urban centers, the local disease origin theory now also
stimulated further
support for movement of the national capital to Washington, D.C.,
the rural site for
which had recently been selected.
The political implications of the medical controversies led the
importationist
Federalists to demand quarantine of shipboard arrivals or a halt
to immigration, and to
call for sharply reduced trade with the Caribbean islands.
However, Republican
merchants saw the importationist theory as a plot to destroy
lucrative West Indies
trade. But the Federalist stance on importation soon became
quite popular in the
young United States, since the thought of a native American
plague irritated a highly
sensitive patriotic nerve. "By denying any local source of the
pestilence, the
Federalists won much chauvinistic and local booster support. ..
In addition the
Federalists managed to identify (and link) their opponents with
Benjamin Rush's
advocacy of a dangerous and controversial remedy.." Ultimately,
no compromise was
ever reached on the stands of the two political parties in regard
to the epidemic's
origins, but after 1793 Philadelphia undertook both quarantine
and sanitary reform
measures.
Although nothing was known about the true causative agent of
yellow fever or
the manner in which the disease was spread, as the epidemic
subsided city leaders
and concerned citizens began to ameliorate what they believed lay
behind the
epidemic, namely, a filthy urban environment and a dangerously
polluted water supply.
Rats, cats, dogs and pigs roamed the streets, which were littered
with garbage and
human and animal excrement. The subsequent undertaking of
extensive public health
measures, the first in an American city, was an exceedingly
important historical
response to the 1793 disease outbreak, receiving repeated
emphasis as recurrent
epidemics of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1797, 1798, and 1799
further decimated
the Philadelphia population.
In the fall of 1793, the Committee on Malignant Fever recommended
that a
health office be established and given wide responsibilities, and
that a site for a
permanent hospital be selected. In December, the returning city
council directed the
Committee "to examine the rooms and houses where people had died
of the fever and
. clean out those still containing the seeds of infection". In
January, 1794, the council
devised a long-term plan to clean the streets better by
systematically watering during
summer and fall with flush carts and scrapers. Bedding and
clothing of former yellow
fever patients were to be smoked and otherwise purified. Later,
the Council issued
guidelines for the paving of roads and the construction of wells
for drinking water.
Installation of proper drainage and elimination of many sources
of standing water were
inadvertently, but directly, related to controlling yellow fever,
as only became
scientifically evident a full century later. For all of these
measures the city now sought
help and advice not from physicians but from civil engineers,
although Rush and others
had emphasized environmental sources of disease which now led to
sound general
public healthy policy.
One major factor missing from earlier planning in 1793 and 1794
was the subject
of a pure water supply. A few years later the connection between
the ingestion of pure
water and bathing to health in general received new strong
emphasis in Philadelphia's
city council. Their report stated that "wholesome water (was)
most effectual to prevent
or mitigate the return of the late contagious sickness". At this
time the earliest water
closet in America, installed in a Baltimore home, dated only from
the mid-1760's. In the
summer of 1799 Elizabeth Drinker of Philadelphia wrote that she
"went into the shower
bath. I bore it better than I expected, not having been wett all
over at once, for 28
years past." Her costume for this wild adventure was a thin gown
and "an oyl cloath
cap" The Drinker's shower was the first ever installed in a home
in this country and
dated only from the year before, 1798. Arguments over
engineering designs and costs
for a centralized water system delayed construction of a safe,
efficient and pure water
supply for Philadelphia until the 1820's. Nonetheless "the
terrible yellow fever outbreak
of 1793 defined the last decade of the century: . it added force
to (inhabitants')
responses to the milder epidemics (of later years) .giving
support to bold urban
initiatives and winning acceptance from a city whose individual
interests had earlier
thwarted (plans for) similar projects."
The United States was hardly alone in its experiences with yellow
fever
epidemics. While the disease was ravaging Philadelphia in 1793,
it was revisiting Haiti
throughout the 1790's and early 1800's. At that time the Haitian
population consisted
of about 30,000 Caucasians and 500,000 African slaves.
Year-round average
temperatures of 80 F and plentiful rainfall led to luxuriant
production of sugar, cotton,
and other crops, making some of the Haitian plantation owners
among the richest men
in the world. A French possession, Haiti accounted for 20% of
France's foreign trade.
However, the excessively cruel treatment of slaves (brandings,
beatings, arbitrary
murders) had resulted in eight armed revolts between 1679 and
1791, all doomed to
failure.
From 1791 on, armed bands of black guerillas constantly harassed
and killed
French plantation owners and burned many of the plantations. In
1791, Toussaint-Louverture, a freed slave and converted Catholic,
who was to become the greatest
figure in Haiti's history, organized an army of blacks and
trained it in guerilla warfare
tactics. A charismatic leader of men, Toussaint seized control
of Haiti and Santo
Domingo when the French National Convention freed the slaves in
1794. In the next
few years he did much to restore the economy, preached
reconciliation of blacks and
whites and established lucrative trade with Britain and the
United States. In 1801, to
solidify his command of the island he drew up a constitution in
the name of France but
without French governmental input. This act angered Napoleon
Bonaparte, now First
Consul and the dominant ruler in Europe, who feared loss of the
island to independent
status. Consequently, Napoleon organized the largest invasion
fleet in France's
history, and dispatched eighty ships and 35,000 men to
reestablish French control of
Haiti. Under the command of General Charles LeClerc , Napoleon's
brother-in-law, the
first ships reached Haiti in February, 1802. Against vastly
superior arms, Toussaint
now cleverly instituted a three-part military program that
included a scorched earth
policy, guerilla warfare, and an eagerly anticipated yellow fever
epidemic that would
strike after the rainy season began in April. Despite initial
capture of several coastal
cities, within four months the French had lost 5,000 men to one
of the deadliest yellow
fever epidemics ever seen in Haiti. LeClerc desperately began
the first of several
requests for reinforcements, only one of which was ever answered
with a fifteen
hundred man force that was almost totally exterminated by yellow
fever. LeClerc 's
physicians now predicted that by fall another 5,000 to 10,000 men
would perish in the
epidemic.
Although Toussaint was captured and exiled to a mountain prison
in France in
June, by early fall of 1802 LeClerc had lost 20,000 of his 35,000
man force to yellow
fever and 8,000 more were in hospitals. With epidemic losses
still climbing LeClerc
wrote to Napoleon in October that, " .my position has turned from
good to
critical .because of the yellow fever". It was now clear to the
French in Haiti and
Napoleon in France that the French troops were fighting for a
lost cause. On
November 2, LeClerc himself died of yellow fever and French hopes
for ultimate victory
were doomed. France's death toll, with some estimates ranging to
two-thirds of their
forces lost to yellow fever, now set in motion one of the most
extraordinary events in
American history.
In dispatching troops to Haiti, Napoleon had had far more
grandiose plans than
simply reestablishing French control there. A secret treaty in
October, 1800, had
traded New Orleans and the Louisiana territory to France for
modern-day Tuscany to
Spain. Napoleon had aimed to base LeClerc 's army in New Orleans
after victory in
Haiti, establish absolute control over Mississippi River trade,
and then raise a 25-30,000 man black force which, with French
reinforcements, could be used to capture
several of the British and Spanish held Caribbean islands.
Ultimately Napoleon
planned possible attacks on Canada and the United States, neither
of which had a
significant standing army.
In the face of the steady erosion of French forces in Haiti and
LeClerc 's
defeatist communiqu s, Napoleon soon realized that the loss of
Haiti was inevitable.
He thereupon abandoned his plan to enlarge France's New World
colonies and
conceived a bold alternate campaign to invade England and then
extend the French
empire further by reconquering Egypt and invading the Middle East
and India.
Although Napoleon never lacked for ambition, what he did need now
was
substantial funding for his newly laid military plans. When
rumors reached President
Jefferson in 1802 that a secret treaty had ceded Spanish rights
in North America,
including control of the Mississippi, to the far more powerful
government of France, "he
promptly concluded that this was the greatest challenge to
American independence and
national integrity since the American Revolution." Jefferson
thereupon authorized an
old French friend to offer six million dollars for the purchase
of New Orleans and the
Mississippi valley, a startling idea for which there was no
constitutional basis. The offer
was refused. James Monroe, former ambassador to France, then
joined Robert
Livingston, current ambassador to France, to continue
negotiations with Talleyrand,
Napoleon's foreign minister. In early 1803 a higher offer of
$9,250,000 was also
refused. But on April 11, realizing that war with Britain and
Europe would leave New
Orleans easy prey for the British navy, Napoleon declared,
"Irresolution and
deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana."
Talleyrand then asked
Livingston, "What will you give for the whole of Louisiana?"
After a further two weeks
of negotiations, the treaty of purchase and cession was concluded
on April 30, 1803,
for $15,000,000: twelve million was paid for Louisiana, and the
United States assumed
French debt of three million dollars payable to United States
citizens who had suffered
naval depredations in 1797 and 1798. Ironically, one week before
the signing of the
treaty, Toussaint-Louverture who, against all odds had set the
events in motion that
had led up to this treaty, died of pneumonia in his French prison
cell.
The Louisiana purchase was the greatest bargain in American
history, eclipsing
by far the purchase of Manhattan from the Indians. Although the
United States
possessed no constitutional power to increase its domain by
treaty, the Senate
nonetheless approved the purchase by a vote of 24 to 7. Formal
possession of
Louisiana - the boundaries of which were unknown but which were
generally agreed to
extend westward to the Rocky Mountains - took place on December
21, 1803.
The Louisiana purchase instantly doubled the land mass of the
United States by
the acquisition of 800,000 square miles. As Livingston remarked,
" . this is the
noblest work of our whole lives .From this day the United States
take their place
among the powers of first rank". The acquired territory included
the future states of
Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Montana, almost all of
Oklahoma and
Kansas, most of Wyoming and Minnesota, and roughly half of
Colorado. As John
Keats has written, "For something under four cents an acre, the
least of nations
acquired an inland empire that contained virtually every sort of
climate, topography, soil
and ore. Every sort of crop and domestic animal could be
produced on it; pools of
petroleum and natural gas awaited discovery . to serve the uses
of a future industrial
society. The timber in Minnesota alone was worth more than the
purchase price of the
entire region . the Louisiana purchase . enabled the United
States to so exploit
these resources as to become a (major) world power .". Finally,
in the words of
Joseph Ellis, Jefferson's recent biographer, "If . one ever
wished to construct a
monument in New Orleans memorializing the Louisiana Purchase,
Jefferson would
have to be a central figure, but he would also have to be flanked
by busts of Toussaint
and his fellow insurrectionaries, plus . a tribute to the deadly
mosquito".
Now, what about that "deadly mosquito"? At a time when nothing
was known
about the cause or prevention of yellow fever, Benjamin Rush had
noted that
"moschetoes" were very numerous in Philadelphia in the summer of
1793. In 1848, Dr.
Josiah Nott first presented the idea of possible disease
conveyance by "insects",
possibly inferring either mosquitoes or microbes. No
experimental or clinical data
supporting this theory were presented, however. In 1881, Carlos
Finlay, a Cuban
physician, asserted that yellow fever was transmitted from person
to person by
mosquitoes. After studying the effects of elevation, temperature
and other factors
affecting the prevalence of hundreds of mosquito species, he
announced - correctly -
that the A des aegypti mosquito was the disease carrier.
However, his numerous
studies of human volunteers failed to demonstrate that these
mosquitoes could transmit
disease from yellow fever patients to individuals from
non-endemic areas. (Such
volunteers were chosen because it had finally been recognized
that a previous attack
of yellow fever conferred permanent immunity). Despite Finlay's
experimental failures,
Ronald Ross' discovery in 1897 that Anopheles mosquitoes were
carriers of malaria
stimulated new interest in the mosquito as a vector for yellow
fever.
In early 1901, American soldiers, stationed in Cuba after the
Spanish-American
war, were dying in large numbers from yellow fever. The army
sent a four-member
commission, headed by Major Walter Reed, to investigate the
disease there. Following
up on Finlay's observations, the commission members heroically
decided to serve as
their own volunteers, since no laboratory animal was yet known to
be susceptible to
yellow fever infection. One member, Jesse Lazear, died after
being bitten by an
infected mosquito, and a second, James Carroll, similarly
developed yellow fever but
survived. After recruiting additional volunteers, the commission
demonstrated that a
yellow fever patient was infective only during the first three
days of illness, and that for
a second case to occur the subject had to be bitten by a mosquito
who had fed on a
patient 10-14 days earlier. Ignorance of these special time
constraints had doomed
Finlay's earlier studies to failure.
Since observations of the A des mosquito had revealed its habit
of depositing
eggs on stagnant water surfaces, William Gorgas, an army medical
sanitation officer
and a recovered yellow fever victim, was now appointed to rid
Havana of yellow fever.
Gorgas eliminated all collections of standing water used for
drinking, bathing, cooking
and other purposes, instigated strict regulations for the use of
screening, put all yellow
fever patients in quarantine and organized a cadre of sanitary
officers and inspectors to
enforce these regulations strictly. From March to August, 1901,
there were only five
deaths from yellow fever in Havana. Over the next several years,
the disease had
entirely disappeared in contrast to at least 500 deaths that had
occurred from it during
every year in the previous decade.
On the strength of his astounding success in Havana, Gorgas was
asked to
conquer the yellow fever problem in Panama, where, in 1904, the
United States had
undertaken construction of the canal. The 51 mile isthmus was a
hopeless tangle of
jungle vegetation, where, as one visitor wrote, "in the world
there is not . any single
spot (with) . so much foul disease." Yellow fever was the
principal killer, though
malaria, typhus and dysentery were also prevalent. During the
earlier and failed
French construction period (1881-1888) in one month alone
(October, 1884) yellow
fever had killed 654 workers. Gorgas later determined that
one-third of France's white
laborers had died of yellow fever with overall losses of 20,000
men. Panama's fearful
disease reputation was such that John Wallace, the first American
engineer assigned
to the Panama Canal project, landed at the isthmus with his wife
and two sturdily
constructed caskets.
Gorgas, arriving at the Canal Zone in 1904, found all of the same
standing water
conditions he had encountered in Havana. Over a six month period
he instigated
essentially the same preventive measures he had employed earlier.
From September,
1906, on, yellow fever became an extinct disease in a region
where it had flourished for
250 years. Moreover, by the time the canal was finished and
opened in August, 1914,
Gorgas' work had reduced the death rate from all diseases to well
below that of any city
or state in the entire United States. David McCullough has
written that, "The creation
of the water passage across Panama was one of the supreme human
achievements of
all time . primarily the Canal is an expression of that old and
noble desire to bridge
the divide, to bring people together. It is a work of
civilization".
Over the following years, Rockefeller Foundation scientists and
other
investigators concentrated on elucidating the causative microbe
of yellow fever. Newer
pathology studies revealed evidence of a virus infection and
monkeys and mice were
now found to be susceptible to virus infected tissue for further
experimentation. Dr.
Max Theiler demonstrated that the virus could be grown in chick
embryo cultures, that
repeated passages so reduced virulence that it no longer produced
laboratory animal
infection, but that this attenuated virus induced excellent
immunity. Mass immunization
against yellow fever in endemic areas was initiated in 1937 and,
in 1951, Theiler was
awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology for his
discoveries.
Unfortunately, unlike smallpox, yellow fever was not destined for
world-wide
eradication. It was found that a mosquito-monkey-human cycle
carried by several other
mosquito species occurred in jungle environs. These mosquitoes
live in tree holes high
above ground and are essentially impossible to eradicate.
Consequently, lack of
uniform vaccination and inability to interrupt the virus' jungle
life cycle have left yellow
fever an endemic disease in many underdeveloped countries. In
1960-62 over 30,000
people died of the disease in Ethiopia, and in 1987, 120,000
cases, with 25,000
deaths, occurred in western Nigeria. In recent years the return
of A des mosquitoes to
parts of South America pose serious additional threats to
possible revivals of major
urban epidemics.
In this century, the accumulation of knowledge about the cause
and spread of
yellow fever now fully explains the Philadelphia story. Active
trade between that city
and several Caribbean islands, where the disease was endemic,
undoubtedly
introduced the A des mosquitoes, as well as the infected
passengers upon whom they
fed, from aboard ship. Water barrels shipboard and swamps and
marshes in
Philadelphia provided innumerable mosquito breeding sites. The
insects limited flying
range confined disease to its urban site. The mosquito's
inability to survive
temperatures below 72 F accounted for disease disappearance in
late fall and its
reappearance with hatched larvae in late spring or early
summer.
The history of yellow fever provides a model for understanding
how disease can
stimulate research, innovation and reform that carry far-reaching
implications for
science and society. The effects of this devastating infection
or its conquest on major
historical events are amply illustrated by the Haitian and
Panamanian epidemics. The
Philadelphia outbreak demonstrates the effects of sudden
overwhelming disease
spread on an urban population: stimulation of a sense of
community, heightened
religious concerns among life and death struggles, financial
problems from an economy
that stops functioning, and convictions of physicians about the
origin and proper
treatment of the disease. Most important was the resultant
struggle by city leaders to
select and establish pioneering public health measures. Lastly,
as Mathew Carey
claimed, only the heroic, selfless actions of a small group of
people created a new
social compact, regenerated central institutions and saved the
city.
To conclude, in the same vein over 200 years later, in 1998,
Michael Oldstone
summed up the impact of sudden overwhelming and devastating
disease outbreaks on
civilization: "In the final analysis, the history of viruses,
plagues and people is the
history of our world and the events that shaped it. It is also a
history of individuals who
worked toward the conquest of viruses and the diseases they cause
. In the end, the
splendor of human history is not in wars won, dynasties formed or
financial empires
built, but in the improvement of the human condition. The
obliteration of diseases that
impinge on our health is a regal yardstick of civilization's
success, and those
(scientists) who accomplish that task will be among the true
navigators of a brave new
world".
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